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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Some people see in all earthly things only a dreary cyclical movement,” 
Heinrich Heine wrote around 1833.1  “In contrast to the fatal and indeed 
fatalistic view,” he added, “there is a brighter view, more closely related to 
the idea of providence.”2   As Heine described it, from this alternative 
perspective  “all earthly things are maturing towards a beautiful state of 
perfection . . . a higher, godlike condition of the human race, whose moral and 
political struggles will at last lead to the holiest peace, the purest brotherhood, 
and the most everlasting happiness.”3 
Constitutionalism is an ancient idea, albeit one long associated with the 
form of regimes in general rather than self-governance under written charters 
that lay down fundamental law.4  As such, constitutionalism began its life 
linked to “dreary cyclical” stories of rise and decline, improvement and 
decadence, splendor and ruin.5  In doing so, it repurposed archaic thinking 
from even earlier to descry the direction of constitutional politics.  But modern 
constitutionalism, especially the neo-providentialist form that many 
Americans have learned to associate with self-governance under a written 
document, is not the same as the archaic or the ancient.  It works with a 
dualism of fundamental and ordinary law that owes its sources to Christian 
theology, making it difficult for any Americans to embrace fully the stories of 
proud ascendancy and inevitable fall in which the archaic imagination and 
then ancient Greeks and Romans trafficked so long. 
At first glance, Jack Balkin’s sparkling new book, The Cycles of 
Constitutional Time, seems to be about a revival of cyclical thinking familiar 
to the ancients amid some sort of ongoing commitment to progressive 
redemption that the moderns brought online.6  But it turns out that it is defined 
less by an ancient dreariness than by a cautious optimism.  In this reflection 
on Balkin’s argument, I wonder if we need to go further for the sake that 
optimism, and therefore break more thoroughly with the analytical and moral 
premises of the ancient framework he adopts. 
There is no doubt that Balkin converts his master concept of cycles from 
the basis for blind guesses and soothsaying prognostications that repetition-
minded premoderns indulged into a sense of probable regularities boasting the 
authority of contemporary political “science.”   But I nonetheless want to 
 
1. HEINRICH HEINE, THE HARZ JOURNEY AND SELECTED PROSE 195 (Ritchie 
Robertson ed. and trans., 2003). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 195–96. 
4. See generally CHARLES H. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT 
AND MODERN (1947). 
5. HEINE, supra note 1 at 195. 
6. JACK BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME  3–4 (2020). 
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express some restlessness regarding the cyclical modeling and 
prognosticating goals of Balkin’s new book before turning to focus a few 
skeptical remarks on his account of judicial review. 
Oddly, Balkin’s story about judicial review has some features that prove 
the distinctive originality of our moment, but it also treats judicial review itself 
as in some sense outside the regularities of cycles or the possibility of greater 
progress alike.7  I want to put maximum analytical and normative pressure on 
how hard a constraint Balkin makes the sort of judicial authority America has 
consecrated, in a moment when more and more Americans are taking a second 
look at it.  Examining what Balkin says, I will reach for the conclusion that 
optimism requires a rather different account of the past and future of judicial 
review – and the country itself. 
II.  CYCLES 
On inspection, The Cycles of Constitutional Time is actually three nearly 
separate books.8  One is indeed about cycles, exploring how to generate a story 
of American constitutional regimes from Stephen Skowronek’s influential 
extrapolation from history of the rise and fall of presidential regimes.9  And 
following Skowronek, Balkin presents the main cycle of American 
constitutional history as having various intermediate points, as an arc that 
seems to head one direction bends back towards the beginning in a series of 
stages.10  The other two books – on polarization and rot – are not about cycles, 
exactly.11  If they are, they concern circles collapsed into lines with two 
endpoints.12  They are, that is, about oscillations.13  Polarization waxes and 
wanes, and rot increases until renovation is necessary, before rot sets in 
again.14  In these latter two cases, there is, so far as I can tell, no attempt to 
build a theory of oscillation between two points into a theory of circular 
movement on a path with identifiable stages. 
Balkin’s investigation of his dynamics is actually three because it is 
organized as separate inquiries.15  The book is itself organized as two cycles, 
first proceeding through each dynamic on its own then repeating the drill to 
 
7. Id. at 69–71. 
8. Id. at 6. 
9. Id. at 13 (citing STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: 
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON (1997)). 
10. Id. at 13–19. 
11. Id. at 6. 
12. Id. at 6–7. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 30, 63. 
15. Id. at 6. 
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theorize judicial review.16  (As I will argue below, some crucial relaxation of 
Balkin’s separation of the dynamics occurs, but only in the book’s second 
half.)  True, the combination of books is amply justified by the repeated 
assertion that America right now is in a particular place within each story.  But 
again, as far as I could tell, there is no deeper attempt to correlate the 
dynamics,17 to explain whether the three always track one another, or whether 
to treat the current perfect storm – the brink of a new regime with 
extraordinary polarization and advanced rot – as explicable or stochastic.  The 
intelligible patterns that Balkin attempts to discern appear within each 
dynamic rather than among them. 
None of these observations is meant to be critical, only to describe my 
understanding of Balkin’s enterprise, and to prepare the ground for placing it 
in a particular tradition.  Of the book’s ambition, there is no doubt.  It marshals 
very different political science literatures in its three parts in order – a 
literature on regimes supplemented by one on the political foundations of 
judicial review in the first part, a literature on polarization in the second, and 
a literature pondering the death of democracy in the third – to apply them to 
constitutional phenomena in what is supposed to be not an ad hoc response to 
our moment but a systemic and unified account of how American history 
works.  
In many ways, it is a heroic enterprise.  But what most deeply unites 
Balkin’s three-books-in-one, aside from the common assertion that the present 
is a fateful moment in all trajectories, is a strikingly naturalistic imaginary.  
Cycles are what planets do, polarization – I believe – comes from wave 
theory, and decrepitude and rot are the fate of living things, not human 
political communities that endure in intergenerational projects of precisely the 
kind constitutions are supposed to allow.  Balkin’s naturalistic metaphors in 
this book are revealing, I want to suggest.  They represent the clearest legacy 
of a premodern mentality in thinking about history and politics, which may 
compromise his attempt to wrest a shred of optimism from the jaws of fate. 
The search for cyclical patterns in history, even more than the other 
natural dynamics Balkin revives, is a classic irrationality that goes all the way 
back.18  Anthropologist Mircea Eliade famously claimed in Cosmos and 
History: The Myth of Eternal Return that the “archaic mind” works by seeing 
 
16. Id. at 3–154. 
17. Of course, the account of rot incorporates that of polarization by 
reference since the latter is one of the “four horsemen of constitutional rot.” Id. at 
49. But unless I missed an earlier instance, Balkin first suggests polarization and 
rot (if not necessarily then “usually”) come together rather late in the book. Id. at 
135. 
18. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 5. 
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what are actually novel events as a matter of “archetypes” and “repetition.”19  
In such consciousness, the eternal return functioned at the cosmic level, and 
among puny humans as part of the universal processes.20  And Eliade therefore 
thought the problem was identifying how fateful it was that, in response to 
difficulties in experience, moderns who had once resolved to “consciously 
and voluntarily creat[e] history” sometimes renounced that goal by reviving 
mythological frameworks.21  “The reappearance of cyclical theories in 
contemporary thought,” Eliade worried skeptically, long before Balkin took 
his turn, “is pregnant with meaning.”22 
The Greco-Roman legacy in theories of “recurrence” proved equally 
massive.23  As Balkin notes, the Greek historian Polybius, writing in the 
Hellenistic period, propounded the most renowned classical account of 
circular stages.24  A bit less mythological and a bit more secular than archaic 
irrationality, and profoundly influential on America’s founders, Polybian and 
other cyclical theories of ancient politics died out in part because they denied 
human freedom and explained too little about what allows for similarity in 
widely divergent settings. 
Though not in exactly the same way, there are similar premodern roots 
to Balkin’s neo-republican story of “rot.”  It is reminiscent of a long-standing 
genre of decadence and renewal only slightly newer than cycles, which has 
been revived almost as often as cyclical history over the centuries.  Often 
deployed to think through Roman decline, it was useful for those anxious for 
the fate of many later polities.  In fact, very often over the centuries of 
Polybius’s influence, the go-to grid of decadence and renewal was embedded 
within the theory of cyclical recurrence, and it is interesting that Balkin hives 
it off as a potentially separate phenomenon to explain the American 
experience.25 
Regardless, the gambit of Balkin’s book is that we can retain the 
analytical and especially the predictive uses of old mythologies of natural 
dynamics in human politics by regrounding them in the framework of current 
political science.  He disclaims any reliance on literal repetition in favor of a 
theory of “rhyming.”26  But in fact, for Balkin’s enterprise to be plausible, he 
has to assume that the cycles and oscillations he charts do have real causal 
 
19. MIRCEA ELIADE, COSMOS AND HISTORY: THE MYTH OF ETERNAL 
RETURN 147 (Willard R. Trask trans. 1959). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 141. 
22. Id. at 147. 
23. G.W. TROMPF, THE IDEA OF HISTORICAL RECURRENCE IN WESTERN 
THOUGHT: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE (1979). 
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foundations that allow sufficiently like situations to recur, because otherwise 
both the analytical and predictive uses of the scheme fall away. 
I am not entirely sure what justifies this crucial last assumption, 
especially given the risks it imposes.  Balkin cryptically acknowledges the 
need for some justification:  “People cause these cycles,” he remarks in the 
closest gesture to deep theory in the book, “the mobilization, organization, 
and the exercise of political will in a particular institutional environment.”27  
I infer that, while Balkin accepts the characteristically modern belief that 
history is whatever humans make it, somehow, and for unexplained reasons, 
they end up doing similar things over and over in relation to institutions they 
have built.  There is no account, however, of why freedom ends up falling into 
ruts.  Balkin insists that – notwithstanding the excellent cover-image of the 
book – “[p]olitics is not astronomy.”28  But he still affirms that things “tend 
to cycle in intelligible ways.”29  Why does that happen? 
Only if there really is something to recurrence does the book make sense, 
and Balkin clearly believes there is.  He is dealing with real phenomena, even 
if nowhere in the book is there a deep accounting for why such patterns can 
obtain across time.  Presumably Balkin thinks that, even if the eternal return 
of the same does not function with the deep foundations that some have 
supposed, in some histories – like American constitutional history – there are 
factors that lead to determination, in an ongoing institutional history that 
remains continuous across difference, constraining whatever freedom actors 
have to tweak their fate.  Within each dynamic, to be sure, there is more to go 
on.  As Skowronek described, within a bipartisan system there will be various 
handoffs of long-term power as parties (more precisely, the presidents who 
lead them) establish long-term hegemony.30  But notably, Balkin does not ever 
really stress that freedom can consist in escaping patterns.  
It was clearly worth a try for Balkin to develop these assumptions, and 
the results illuminate a lot.  There is so much in the framework that is 
interesting and striking on which I have not wasted my words.  But somehow 
– for me at least – the results still bear too many worrisome hallmarks of 
premodern attempts to read the signs of the times.  Such accounts offer insight 
but risk two distortions in particular.  They have a difficult time dealing with 
new situations and original moves, and suppress both by transforming them 
into recurrence and repetition.  Analytically, they reverse engineer logics to 
explain contingency in real time as necessity after the fact.31  Prescriptively, 
 
27. Id. at 5. 
28. Id. at 6. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 13–14 (citing SKOWRONEK, supra note 9). 
31. One especially interesting example, because it involves a failure of self-
reference, is Balkin’s own placement of his trajectory in the story. He reports that 
his current “living originalist” strategy was one among many ways liberals 
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they offer hope, if it is available at all, within the terms of recurrence, rather 
than in the possibility of fuller novelty. 
In both respects, Balkin’s stories share the trademark sin of the 
premodern past: they are about qualifying or even renouncing freedom.  This 
is especially true when whatever determination is associated with quasi-
natural processes is revealed to be far weaker than otherwise because their 
triple convergence – as now – gives rise to an unprecedented situation that no 
longer rhymes with the past.  As I want to show next, Balkin’s story of judicial 
review verges on portraying just that kind of distinctive moment right now. 
III.  JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Balkin’s engagement with how judicial review figures in the three 
dynamics is wonderful all the way through, and taught this amateur a great 
deal about how admiration for and criticism of judicial review tracks the cycle 
of constitutional regimes.  Equally interesting is Balkin’s exploration of 
polarization and rot, and their effects both on the functions of judicial review 
and on theories about its uses.  His predictions are powerful, and might even 
be right.  But it is possible that Balkin’s framework both concedes too much 
to the durability of judicial review in the first place, and misses the unique 
features of our moment on Balkin’s own account. 
Start with how Balkin sees our present. Balkin’s constitutional regimes 
story suggests that America is on the brink of a new one, which – on its own 
– does plausibly justify the inference that liberals currently calling more and 
more plaintively for judicial restraint will move to embrace judicial power as 
soon as they dominate.32  But the polarization and rot stories, which crucially 
turn out to be companions, have collapsed the credibility of judicial politics at 
the end of their cycles.  So there is not just the fact that, within the tales of 
polarization and rot, judicial review is powerless to negate the extreme 
situation within each dynamic.  Rather, for that very reason, it is hard to 
understand why judicial review would play its expected role should 
progressives found a new constitutional regime.  The unique moment coming 
 
responded to the erosion of their side’s capture of the judiciary in the middle of 
the twentieth century, without mentioning his origins as a “crit” and defender not 
of liberalism but rather of “transcendent justice.” See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Being Just 
with Deconstruction, 3 SOC. AND LEGAL STUDIES 393 (1994). 
32. Perhaps because the generational arguments on which Balkin relies put 
me in a different place, I read the liberal trajectory as less about the relinquishment 
of investment in judicial review than about its preservation, in part for the sake of 
the institutional and public authority of constitutional scholarship, and the main 
puzzle from where I sit is why it took so long for the credibility of politics through 
constitutional judges to endure as an organizing proposition. BALKIN, supra note 
6, at 27. 
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or starting, in other words, seems on Balkin’s own account to be one in which 
progressives will face the temptation to re-embrace judicial review after a bout 
of skepticism when the political supports for it have been polarized and rotted 
away.  This is not something that has happened before.  Why, then, assume 
the cycle of regimes will stick to type? 
Balkin starts the judicial review section of his book with a chapter that 
generalizes about the topic, rather than delving into one cycle or another.33  In 
particular, Balkin offers some compelling reasons for the endurance and 
growth of political supports for judicial review across time.34  Balkin 
independently supposes that judicial review is desirable, a proposition he does 
not defend, especially with arguments about the intrusive and strong form 
Americans developed (and the rest of the world rejects).35  But – in the 
traditions of public law theory in political science – he believes that regardless 
of its moral importance, judicial power always grows, in part because 
politicians have good strategic reasons to transfer authority to the courts.36 
As the plot thickens, however, chapters nine and ten about polarization 
and rot both come closest in Balkin’s generally disunified account to a 
combined story of all three dynamics, with both polarization and rot 
undermining the political supports for judicial review.37  Indeed, I found the 
rot chapter the most compelling in the book because I take it to weaken the 
ordinary expectations one might have (again, on Balkin’s own theory) of what 
is likely to happen when the judiciary is dragged over the threshold of a new 
cycle.  Its breakdown in a time of polarization and, especially, its failures to 
help counteract rot mean it may lack enough  basic legitimacy for political 
supports to be likely to return like magic once a comprehensive reset of the 
dynamics has occurred. 
I may be wrong about the case for internal self-refutation in Balkin’s 
book.  But I also have some independent doubts leading in the same direction.  
It is significant that Balkin starts the second half of The Cycles of 
Constitutional Time with a chapter about the endurance – indeed 
intensification – of judicial review through history no matter what.38  But once 
one places Balkin’s provincially American political science literature about 
judicial review in its place, it is hard to fathom why the secular increase in 
judicial power across time or the idea that politicians inevitably turn to 
judiciaries to do their dirty work are anything like iron laws. 
 
33. Id. at 69–80. 
34. Id. at 74–77. 
35. Id. at 10–11 (“[J]udicial review remains a desirable feature of 
constitutional design.”). 
36. Id. at 74–77 
37. Id. at 112–147. 
38. Id. at 69. 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss2/12
2021] POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 579 
  
For most of modern history outside America, the progressive consensus 
was that transferring policy authority to judges, for all its uses, involved 
greater risks, and was generally avoided.39  Even once America’s model 
became hegemonic in its unipolar geopolitical moment around 1989, no one 
acted to establish the extreme form of judicial review of our system.  Balkin’s 
cycles bake in all this provincialism outside the frame, I suspect simply 
because Balkin is allowing his normative support for judicial review, 
repeatedly expressed in his pages, to constrain our options in our distinctive 
current moment. 
This has a lot of consequences for Balkin’s nearly standalone chapter, 
late in the book, on judicial reform.40  I have no quarrel, of course, with 
Balkin’s advice “not to expect too much from courts, and endeavor to keep 
them from doing too much harm” in the next few years.41  That a now 
Trumpified judiciary is not going to provide the way out of polarization and 
rot strikes me as quite right.  But it by no means follows that we must and will 
limit progressive engagement with the institutional power of courts to damage 
control, before making them our instrument when the time is right. Neither 
the obvious uses of doing so nor Balkin’s plea that “Americans should not 
give up on judicial review” are conclusive.42 
Balkin’s specific proposals for judicial reform – docket control, on the 
one hand, and bench renewal plus term limitation, on the other – are striking 
because they are almost entirely unrelated to the intellectual project of reading 
the tea leaves of American regularities.43  Alteration in docket control has 
been done on its own (or at least, without Balkin explaining where it fits in 
his stories), while bench renewal plus term limitation has never been done 
before. 
In other words, even to the extent Balkin includes it in The Cycles of 
Constitutional Time, court reform is independent of the processes the book is 
about, past and future.  And if that is true, one might ask, why not do other 
things, especially with the current extraordinary coincidence of the brink of a 
new regime with advanced polarization and rot?  In any event, Balkin’s own 
proposals are guided principally by the normative desire, at least as I read the 
chapter, of de-dramatizing appointments battles.  It is not just that there are 
many other plausible normative goals to shape court reform, but that no 
coming concatenation of causal factors in American cycles could preempt the 
need to compare and contrast them and do the right thing.44  If Democrats 
 
39. Id. at 74. 
40. Id. at 148–56. 
41. Id. at 150–51. 
42. Id. at 150. 
43. Id. at 152–56. 
44. Cf. Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme 
Court, 109 CAL. L. REV. ___ 51–71 (2021), 
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triumph and face down the Supreme Court, and then choose to stock it with 
their jurists, it will have been one option among others – a choice that, even if 
Balkin is proven right that they make it rather than altering judicial power, 
will come not so much a predictive necessity as a choice with benefits and 
risks that could have gone differently. 
IV.  HOPE AND OPTIMISM 
When we scratch the surface, my suspicion is that Balkin has developed 
the intellectual scheme of The Cycles of Constitutional Time in response to 
short-term events – above all, Donald Trump’s presidency – to domesticate 
the shock of the recent outcome and wrest optimism from a catastrophe that 
no cyclical theory could ever explain.  This is not a book that would have been 
written before 2016, and it will come to be seen as a product of its time, a 
clarifying but also confused attempt to reckon with genuine novelty by 
diminishing it and salvaging from the latest American wreckage a modicum 
of liberal hope.  Perhaps the Trump presidency requires something else: 
acknowledging more of its originality as a basis for a more radical optimism 
instead. 
Not that there is a neat alternative to cyclical histories in my kind of 
progressive futurism, which – like most accounts of linear evolution – are 
freighted themselves with profound ancient legacies in their own right.  Those 
who have long since given up religion but think of history as a forum of 
opportunity indulge in one of Judeo-Christianity’s biggest contributions to 
Western culture.45 
As Heine understood, in hoping not for cyclical return but novel 
“progress,” the expectation that the arc of the moral universe is bending 
towards justice, people are caught up in profound neo-providentialist legacies 
in modern thought.  To endorse a plausible account of betterment, the task of 
extricating ourselves from the premodern legacies so as to reconcile our 
beliefs about history and institutions with our understanding of human 
freedom is no easy matter.  But then, a progressive understanding of time is 
no less amenable to reconstruction in modern and secular terms than archaic 
and ancient cyclicality, and in any event Balkin wants both things. 
On their own, I am not so sure Balkin’s cycles justify the modestly 
optimistic scenario the book champions as an alternative to outright despair.  
One of the interesting features of Balkin’s rhetoric throughout his book is that 
he assumes his readers are depressed, and might need the tonic of political 




45. See, e.g., KARL LÖWITH, MEANING IN HISTORY: THE THEOLOGICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 19 (1949). 
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current situation is bleak, there is no reason to give in to cynicism or 
demobilization.  Though courts may not save us from our circumstances, the 
American nation has been here before and can both survive and thrive, if it 
seizes the possibilities of the moment. 
Even within the terms of his own argument, it is not clear how Balkin 
can justify near term optimism.  Donald Trump lost, but Joe Biden’s victory 
most likely marks an attempted restoration rather than anything like 
realignment, and there is no particular reason to believe that it will only take 
“five to ten years” to get through the current impasse.46  Those on the left and 
right who have been operating roughly within Balkin’s own assumptions, like 
Ross Douthat and Corey Robin, are generally careful to note that the 
availability of a new regime by no means guarantees it comes about in the 
near term, instead of the dithering of late-cycle repetition.47   “We are in 
transition,” Balkin observes.48  But you can be in a transition a long time. 
And I am very sure that cycles fail to allow for a more grandiosely 
utopian set of possibilities.  In the end, my own frustration with Balkin’s 
account is that he relies too heavily on naturalistic thinking, without seeking 
opportunities for free action outside the terms of his reconstructed past.  The 
Cycles of Constitutional Time seems to curtail our grounds for hope without 
enough warrant, and shut down reasonable demands for bigger alternatives to 
our constitutional history – including the role it has accorded judicial review 
– than Balkin seems to want. 
Do not get me wrong: I love everything about Balkin’s book, for its 
achievements in rethinking American’s constitutional past in wonderfully 
compelling ways.  I just bridle at the modesty of its predictions for the future, 
which the past does not seem to require.  But I would not bet on Balkin being 
wrong either. 
 
46. Balkin, supra note 6, at 12; see generally Scott Detrow & Asma Khalid, 
Biden Wins Presidency, According to AP, Edging Trump in Turbulent Race, NPR, 
(Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/07/928803493/biden-wins-
presidency-according-to-ap-edging-trump-in-turbulent-race 
[https://perma.cc/VHS4-C2LT]. 
47. Ross Douthat, Trump, Sanders, and the Revolt Against Decadence, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2016) (observing “how hard it is for a decadent society to escape 
the trap of repetition”); Corey Robin, The Politics Trump Makes, N+1, (Jan. 11, 
2017) (stating Trump could “founder in disjunction”). 
48. Balkin, supra note 6, at 7. 
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